Agama, Obama, Amerika

Djayadi Hanan

Dinegara maju seperti Amerika, dinegara berkembang seperti Indonesia, soal agama dan politik tampaknya sama saja. Fenomena Barrack Obama di Amerika adalah bukti paling mutakhir betapa agama tak dapat dilepaskan dari kehidupan politik.

Diawal kemunculannya sebagai bakal calon presiden lebih dari setahun yang lalu sebagian publik Amerika mulai mempersoalkan kaitan Obama dengan Islam. Ayahnya yang berasal dari Kenya adalah seorang muslim. Berkembang pula rumor bahwa ketika berada di Indonesia, Obama bersekolah di “madrasah.” Bagi publik Amerika, madrasah berkonotasi sebagai sekolah tempat muslim radikal. Seorang reporter Fox News, ketika membahas masalah ini di sekitar akhir 2007 lalu berkomentar kira-kira begini: “if he really attended a radical muslim school in Indonesia, this is huge!” Kalimat “this is huge” maksudnya untuk menunjukkan bahwa ini adalah masalah besar yang tak boleh diabaikan. CNN kemudian membuat liputan tandingan atas masa lalu Obama di Indonesia. Nyatalah kemudian bahwa Obama hanyalah bersekolah di SD negeri dikawasan Menteng Jakarta Pusat.

Salah satu website kelompok konservatif di Amerika, Human Events, mengulas bahwa bila Obama terpilih sebagai presiden, maka ia akan menjadi presiden muslim pertama di Amerika. Brian Williams, seorang pewawancara terkenal dari NBC Amerika, ketika menjadi panelis dalam debat antara Hillary dan Obama dalam pemilihan pendahuluan di Ohio, juga mengkonfirmasi dan meminta komentar Obama soal kemuslimannya. Kata Brian, “sebagian publik Amerika mempercayai rumor bahwa anda ketika disumpah menjadi senator mewakili Negara Bagian Illinois, tidak menggukana Bible, tapi menggunakan Koran (Qur’an), apa pendapat anda?” Obama ketika itu hanya tersenyum dan sekali lagi menyatakan berita itu bohong dan dia tidak pernah menjadi muslim. Seorang pendeta konservatif, yang menjadi pendukung John McCain, saya lupa namanya, selalu menyebut nama Obama secara lengkap dalam pidatonya: Barrack Hussein Obama. Kata “Hussein” selalu lebih ditekankan dalam penyebutan itu. Maksudnya tentu saja untuk menunjukkan kaitan antara Obama dengan muslim/Islam.

Dalam salah satu FGD (Focused Group Discussion) yang disiarkan oleh stasiun televisi publik PBS, salah satu yang muncul dibenak peserta ketika ditanya soal Obama oleh moderator adalah bahwa dia seorang muslim. Ketika ditanya lagi apa memang benar begitu, kebanyakan peserta itu ragu-ragu. Artinya mereka tidak yakin apa benar Obama bukan muslim. Fenomena paling terkini adalah kartun di surat kabar The New Yorker yang menggambarkan Obama berpakaian seperti Taliban dan Michelle (istrinya) yang berpakaian teroris dan bersenjata, sedang beradu kepalan tangan (tanda keakraban) dengan latar belakan bendera Amerika yang dibakar. Stasiun TV Fox News yang juga memberitakan kartun ini, menyiarkan pula hasil survey terbaru soal kaitan Obama dengan muslim. Dari survey itu, 12 persen publik Amerika percaya bahwa Obama seorang muslim, 32 persen percaya Obama dibesarkan keluarga muslim, dan lebih dari 40 persen percaya bahwa Obama memiliki “muslim connection.”

Apa kesimpulan sementara yang dapat ditarik? Bukan soal benar tidaknya Obama sebagai seorang muslim yang penting. Meskipun secara teoritis demokrasi membolehkan siapa saja menjadi presiden, tampaknya, kesamaan agama antara presiden dengan mayoritas penduduk sudah menjadi semacam kelaziman kalau bukan keharusan tak tertulis. Agama, tetap merupakan hal yang penting dalam politik di Amerika, setidaknya bagi sebagian publik. Selain itu, Islam/muslim, setidaknya bagi sebagian masyarakat Amerika masih dianggap sebagai ancaman. Salah satu sebabnya mungkin adalah kesalahfahaman. Bila benar demikian, tugas kedua belah pihak untuk saling menjelaskan, masih sangat banyak.

Authoritarianism in Democratization Era

Djayadi Hanan

As suggested by Huntington (1991), the last quarter of the twentieth century can be regarded as the third wave of democratization. It is featured by the fall of dictatorship/authoritarian rulers in many parts of the world from Portuguese to Mexico, from Eastern Europe to Latin America to Asia and Africa (Brownlee, 2007). Democracy starts flourishing in these many areas following the demise of the authoritarianism. Some of them are moving toward consolidation, some are still struggling to finish the transition period. Despite this big wave of democratization, many of the authoritarian rulers/regimes are still persistent. Several of the democratizing countries even reverted back to authoritarianism.

This paper reviews a number of current literatures that deal with the question of why and how the authoritarian regime/ruler can still be persistent in the current democratization era. It will bring the answer to this question offered by the literature on democratization and social movement. Schock (2005) has pointed out that democratization theory usually focuses its explanation about the process of democratization based on either the structural requisites of democracy or transaction among elites. On the other hand, social movement perspectives focus on the process of mass political contention which, almost always precedes democratization. This paper looks at these explanations by examining how they deal with the persistent of authoritarianism in facing the wave of democratization.

Why the Question is Important?

The question of why authoritarianism is still persistent despite the global third wave of democratization is important both for empirical and theoretical reasons. Many authoritarian regimes in the area expected to be swept away by democratization wave still last until today. Several countries, such as Cuba in Latin America, do not experience any change, although the structural condition seems to be favorable to democratization (Hawkins, 2001). In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Indonesia, two big island countries, have become electoral democracy for more than a decade while others in this region still show their authoritarian characteristics (Slater, 2006). The view that most countries are being swept by democratization wave is becoming debatable. Many democratizing countries/transition countries have problems in consolidating their democracies. Several of them such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru and Uruguay experience reversal process to authoritarianism (Tilly, 2003).

From theoretical point of view, understanding why many contemporary authoritarian regimes last will enable the scholars not to be trapped by the “narrowly defined frame of modern political institutions: parties, legislatures, and most prominently elections” (Brownlee, 2002: 478). Many regimes have and practice those kinds of political institutions, but it does not necessarily mean that they are democratic. Moreover, the study on democratization has been focusing mainly on countries experiencing democratization or transition to authoritarianism, and not so much on the absence of transition. By examining the persistence of authoritarianism, the scholars will be able to “examine all outcomes on the dependent variable: regime stability as well as regime change” (Hawkins, ibid: 441).

In reviewing the accounts on the persistence of authoritarianism in this era of democratization I categorize the countries into countries that do not experience transition or only experience liberalization and countries that experience transition. In general, the explanations about the persistence of authoritarianism in the last half of the twentieth century (third wave of democratization) introduce the concept of authoritarian resilience (Nathan, 2002) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2003). Authoritarian resilience is the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of state organization under the regime. Competitive authoritarianism is a type of hybrid regime in which it does not meet the standard of democracy but still allows democratic institutions such as opposition to play out and the regime is playing around between cracking it down and losing power. Besides that, in the countries where democratization is in the struggle of completing the transition or trying to move to consolidation, the possibility of de-democratization is high because of authoritarian nostalgia and the disillusionment of democracy.

Elites and Structural Perspectives

In the countries where the transition is absent, the explanation about authoritarian resilience can be considered based on elites and structural perspectives. The most salient region in which authoritarianism has consistently shown its resilience is the Middle East. Some countries in other areas such as in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe have also showed their durability in maintaining authoritarianism. Elite and structural explanations on these literatures sometimes emphasize only one of them and sometimes make the link between the two. This makes sense because authoritarian regime is usually featured by certain dominant elite and supported by certain authoritarian structures.

Many examples of structural based account can be mentioned here. Brownlee (2004 and 2007), by examining Egypt and Malaysia and comparing them to Iran and the Philippines, shows that party institutionalization is the explanatory variable of the durable authoritarianism. Ruling/dominant parties in Egypt and Malaysia have been able from time to time to resolve intra-elite conflict and prevent further schism because of defection of influential leaders. In Iran and the Philippines, the decline of the ruling party has encouraged open and unresolved elite conflicts and provides further structural condition for opposition mobilization. Electoral politics, instead of destabilizing the regime, has been used as method of coalition maintenance among elites and preserving the authoritarianism. This notion of institutional manipulation is also used by Schedler (2002) by introducing the electoral authoritarianism in which the regime uses electoral manipulation to control electoral outcomes.

In Syiria, Wedeen (1999) uses the concept of “disciplinary symbolic power” which has structured the compliance of the citizens based on the centralization of authority and the creation of cult of Hafez al-Asad (the President). Through this mechanism of disciplinary symbolic power, the citizens were compelled to believe that they accept the cult’s claims. This mechanism has enabled the authoritarian ruler to maintain the power. Bellin (2004) also uses structural/institutional explanation when she points out to the will and coercive capacity of the state in suppressing the democratic initiatives, if any. Authoritarian regimes like in the Middle East, according to Bellin, have all elements of the robustness of coercive apparatus namely the fiscal health, the successful maintenance of international support, the low level of institutionalization of security establishment, and the degree of popular mobilization that it faces (the lower the more robust). Meanwhile, Vandewalle (1998), through his examination of Libya under Qadafhi, looks at the structure of state revenue (oil) which does not rely on people (taxation) as the factor that gives the ability to the personalistic regime to “buy” the people by sharing some of the state income to the citizens and strengthen the power.

Several other works have focused mainly on elite approach when explaining the persistence of authoritarianism in the countries where transition is absent. Monarchiism/family rule approach is used by Herb (1999) to examine many Persian Gulf current monarchies such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Herb shows that by keeping the power and its distribution among the royal families, the state has been able to prevent the dangerous political disputes among elites which can lead to the breakdown of the regime. All members of elites get their share in all top levels of government positions and make them secured in the system and resistant to the possible changes. Like Herb in the Persian Gulf, Hawkins (ibid) uses a more elite approach in examining why the authoritarianism is persistent in Cuba. Hawkins shows that “the absence of key democratizing agent inside Cuba—independent social group and softline regime factions” as the key factor in the durability of Cuban authoritarianism (ibid: 441). Cuba, according to Hawkins experiences all structural pressures favorable to regime breakdown such as socioeconomic development, economic crisis, and international pressure, but the state leadership (Castro) and its charismatic legitimacy have prevented the emergence of democratizing actors.

Meanwhile, Jones (1998) finds that illiberal character of middle class as important factor. The rise of middle class in East and Southeast Asia does not support the notion that the middle class will facilitate the authoritarian regime change toward democracy. Ruling elite and middle class in East and Southeast Asia according to Jones are “ideologically, economically, and ethnically homogeneous” (ibid: 156). This kind of middle class is state dependent and quiescent. Therefore, instead of demanding more liberalization and democratization, this middle class plays active roles in strengthening the state, especially in supporting its development strategy. This illiberal character of middle class has been one factor that maintains the durability of authoritarianism.

This structural and elite approach has been able to identify that the narrow definition of electoral democracy is not enough to understand whether the transition has been underway or not. Authoritarian regimes in fact use this electoral mechanism as one way to legitimize their existence. Differentiating liberalization from democratization, therefore, is important to understand the durability of authoritarianism. Liberalization has been used by the regime to respond to the increasing demands of democracy. This is possible because liberalization is characterized by “the more modest goal of merely loosening restrictions and expanding individual and group rights within an authoritarian regime” (Shin, 1994: 142) and the regime keeps an eye on its process and makes necessary adjustment based on assessment whether its power is in jeopardy or not. Introducing election, for example, can be merely part of this kind of liberalization.

One main critique to this structural and elites explanation is on its tendency to neglect the masses or the development of civil society. Kurzman (1996) for example shows that the state strengths cannot account for the durability of the authoritarian regime. The masses and civil society organizations, through the accumulation of shifting perception about the ability of the masses to overcome the strength and the threat of the state could finally bring down the regime. Another issue is international ties. Most of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East for instance have strong support from the West. Regimes like in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have been enjoying the strong supports from the United States for decades. This has enabled the regimes to not rely so much on the legitimacy of the people and have room for using repression indiscriminately which in turn only provide very limited space for the opposition to grow. Related to these international ties, also important to note that in especially Middle Eastern countries where the durability of authoritarianism is the most salient one, the role of cultural explanation (Islam) cannot be neglected. The demand for more open system in this area have been mostly voiced by the so called Islamist movement such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004) and Salafi Movement in Saudi Arabia (Okruhlik, 2004). It is possible that the fear that a more open/democratic system will be captured by Islamists as the venue for advancing their agendas has made the international supports from the West take side to the authoritarian regimes rather than democratization.

Social Movement Perspective

Especially in the countries where the transition to democracy involved political contentions and or mass political protest, scholars have been using the social movement perspective to understand why authoritarian regime does not experience its breakdown. In contrast to structural/elite approach, the focus therefore has been on the development of civil society.

Examining democratic transition in Asia, Lee (2002), for example, by using social movement perspectives, maintains that the primary cause of the transition is political protest. In other words, the absence of political protest and the availability of the regime to crush the movement can explain why the authoritarianism persists. The common characteristics of this political protest are: 1) mainly conducted by college students started from the capital city and spread out to many major cities in the country; 2) supported by the middle class; 3) using broad umbrella organization; and 4) it resulted in snowball effect from domestic level all the way up to international level.

Another example is the work from Kurt Schock (1999, 2005) who uses the social movement framework to look at the ability of authoritarian regimes to be resilience. According to him, the inability of the protest movement to be resilient and the absence of the structure of political opportunities such as in Burma and China determine the durability of the authoritarian regimes. There are three keys to Schock’s argument. First, the paradox of repression. All regimes responded with series of repression to the movements, but the effect was different. In South Africa, the Philippines, Nepal, and Thailand it resulted in the strengthening of the challengers while in Burma and China resulted in the collapse of the movements. Schock explains that “… repression may increase or decrease mobilization depending on the presence or absence of other dimensions in the opportunity structure” (2005: 33) such as the influential allies. Second, the movement’s resilience. This resilience is determined by whether or not the challengers’ organization is decentralized or centralized. The more decentralized the movement, the more resilient it will be. Third, leveraging capacity or the ability to activate the third parties to support the movement. In part this is related to the first and second factors, and in another part it depends on the appeal of the movement.

Several critical assessments can be designated to this approach. First, it cannot explain why in certain authoritarian countries civil society is ready to protest and not in other authoritarian countries. Political opportunity approach for example cannot explain why there was no strong/massive political protest in Cuba despite the availability of such windows of opportunities. Second, it can only explain the breakdown or the persistence of regime, not the trajectory of the movement. Social movement approach cannot answer why for example in Iran, the breakdown of the authoritarian regime was then followed by the establishment of another authoritarian system. Finally, this approach can only explain the liberalization process. In the case of authoritarian resilience, the elites and states are more important. Liberalization can be introduced and the social movement can grow but as long as the elites and state remain intact the social movement can only play limited role.

Incomplete Democratization Perspective

In the countries where democratization is underway, scholars use the democratization process to understand why some countries are experiencing the slowing down of transition or reverted democratic process. Shin (1994) has identified that at least there are four stages of democratization: decay of authoritarian rule; transition; consolidation; and the maturing of democratic political order. Countries that cannot move forward through these stages (incomplete process of democratization) are in danger of going back to authoritarianism.

According to Kubicek (1998), the resistance to change of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia for instance is caused by many structural factors which cannot facilitate the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes. Those structural factors are low level of economic development, traditional culture, weak civil society, the communist legacy, and ethnic cleavages. The absence of factors favorable to democratization, in other words, provides room for authoritarian regime to remain the same. Thus, Kubicek basically argues that these Central Asian countries has been in the process of the decay of authoritarianism but cannot move to the transition process.

Another account is about backward democratization. From their study on Russia, Czech and the Republic of Korea, Rose and Shin (2001) introduce the notion of backward democratization that leads to incomplete democratization which in turn can bring the process back to authoritarianism. According to them, democracies in the first wave countries have been supported by the availability of modern state institutions before electoral democracy was introduced and make it stable democracy. In contrast, democracy in the third wave countries is featured by the lack of modern state institutions which provides the possibilities for authoritarian elites to capture the process and revert it back to authoritarianism. Incomplete process is also featured by institutional democratization that is not followed by cultural democratization. Embracing democracy as “the only game in town” is the first step, not the last step of democratization (Shin and Tusalem, 2007). Democracy is the government by demos, therefore, without the people who have political attitudes, beliefs and values of democracy such as efficacy, tolerance, and trust, democratization cannot sustain and in danger of being reverted.

Perhaps, the most common account on the slowing down of democratization or the reverted process is the problem democratic disillusionment and authoritarian nostalgia (Bratton, 2004; Chang et.al., 2007). In Africa, according to Bratton, the people soon realize that, after the regime change but not followed by the change in their quality of life and the incumbents who are supported by popular mandate indulge themselves in corrupt and manipulative behavior, there is no real change or improvement. In this situation, Bratton continues, “it does not take long until the general public becomes disillusioned with democracy” (ibid: 148). Facing this problem, one of the people’s main choices according to Chang et.al. (ibid) is the “authoritarian nostalgia.” Especially in East and Southeast Asia, this nostalgia is important because the performance of former authoritarian regime especially in economic growth is used by the people as the bar to see the progress under new democracy. When they do not get their dream in the process of democracy they start remembering the good side of authoritarian regime (especially economic growth) and want it back. The example of the transition process in Benin (Bratton and Walle, 1994) in which the people went back to choose the former authoritarian leader is a very good example of this phenomenon.

Although it is good in explaining why some countries go back to authoritarianism, this democratization process approach can be criticized as focusing very much on structural factors. The agency and civil society at the most are only part of the process. Again, it cannot answer why in country like Cuba, where all structural favorable factors available, yet there is still no transition (elite choice is not considered). Besides that, this approach does not explain how the contentious politics contributes to the strategy of regime in maintaining its power. As has been shown by Lee (2002), political protest matters in democratic transition and the resilience of authoritarianism in Asia. In addition, this approach focuses only on countries where democratization occurs, thus cannot be used to examine why there is no transition in certain countries.

Conclusion

This short review has tried to show that the ability of authoritarian regimes to survive despite being swept away by the wave of democratization is related to complex factors. On one side, the authoritarian regime’s institutionalization and cohesiveness can manage to meet the challenges and to some extent manipulate part of democratization process to support the maintenance of the regime. On the other side, attempts to bring down the regime in several countries are weak and the process of democratization is protracted and tiring resulted in disillusionment of democracy in many countries. The combination of these many factors can keep authoritarian regimes remain durable or revert the democratization process back to authoritarianism.

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Leadership and Change: In Search of Human Agency

Djayadi Hanan

The conceptualization of agency and structure and the relationship between the two will affect how we view the role of leadership, especially in its relation to change. Leadership is usually associated with the emphasis on human agency. Imbroscio, in his discussion on “Structure, Agency and Democratic Theory” (1999) for instance, suggests that the emphasis on agency or structure will determine to what extent the role of democratic leader is conceptualized. It also will have significant implication to the practice of democracy. Similarly, what is change and what factors cause it are questions that bring the debate in social sciences, including political science, into the contrast and relations between agency and structure. Change can be caused by agency or structure or by both of them depends on how the social scientists define agency, structure, and the relations among them. Literature on transition to or the breakdown of democracy, for example have been engaging in the debate between the voluntarism camp which takes the agency as the explanatory factor, and the determinism camp which emphasizes the role of structure as the cause of the regime change (Mahoney and Snyder, 1999; Kitschelt, 1992).

This paper looks at several notions/concepts which are developed by social scientists about the role of agency and structure and identify some of its implications on the conceptualization of the role of leader and leadership as human agency especially in its relation to change. With different point of departure, three articles from Emirbayer and Mische (1998), Sewell (1992) and Mahoney and Snyder (1999) reviewed in this paper are attempting to look at agency and structure without being in favor of one and eliminating the other. This paper argues that the conceptualization of agency and structure and their relationship which attempts to view that the existence of one does not deny the other will be useful to understand how leadership (leaders) can make a difference in social change.

Defining Agency: An Autonomous Actor?

All articles reviewed in this paper claim that they are attempting to put both agency and structure in a way that is not in favor of one or the other. It is interesting that both article that focuses on agency such as Emirbayer and Mische’s, and article that focuses on structure such as Sewell’s started with the statement that the subject they are dealing with is the most under theorized, elusive, and confusing in social sciences. Both structure and agency seem to suffer the same conceptualization problem especially on the relationship between the two.

In conceptualizing the relationship between agency and structure, most theories, according to Emirbayer and Mische tend to make agency “…remain so tightly bound to structure that one loses sight of the different ways in which agency actually shapes social action” (963). Agency according to them must be reconceptualized by looking at its several analytical elements and how those elements related to (interpenetrate) with structures. Therefore they define agency as:

“the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments—the temporal relational contexts of action—which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations” (Emirbayer and Mische: 970).

Because of its capacity to differentiate the different dimensions of agency, Emirbayer and Mische argue that their conceptualization “can help account for variability and change in actors’ capacities for imaginative and critical intervention in the diverse contexts within which they act” (970). Their conceptualization is also claimed to focus on the dynamic possibilities of human agency by viewing it as “composed of variable and changing orientations within the flow of time” (964).

This conceptualization provides clear place for human agency. It assumes that agency has its own reasoning and consciousness (imagination) in its efforts of intervening diverse contexts. This notion of temporal constructive engagement seems to be in line with the conceptualization from Bhaskar (1979: 48-49) that “social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity.”

Based on their definition, Emirbayer and Mische propose three constitutive elements of agency i.e. iteration, projectivity, and practical evaluation. Iteration is “the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time” (971). Projectivity is “the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future” (971). Practical evaluation is “the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations” (971).

By introducing these constitutive elements, especially on the projective capabilities of the agency, Emirbayer and Mische give further place and significant role to human agency in the making of change. Projective element seems to imply that human agency has the capabilities of constructing the future and use the current temporal engagement to achieve it. This projection of future can be put in the current framework of structure or outside it. In line with this assessment, Hays categorizes change into reproductive and transformative (1994:63-64). By using the temporal constructive engagement of Emirbayer and Mische, it can be further stated that agency can construct the engagement as to reproduce or transform the structure. Burns’s notion on transforming leadership (1978) can also be understood in the framework of these constitutive elements of agency.

In the current dichotomy of agency–structure, Emirbayer and Mische’s conceptualization of agency starts from the side of agency and then projects it to structure. Clearly, agency is more a focus here. The problem with this conceptualization is that it has the tendency to assume that actor always understands the contexts. Or actor can always adjust its engagement construction over time in a changing context. The first problem is that actor does not always understand the context. Wendt (1987: 359) has pointed out that “agents may not understand the structural antecedents or implications of their actions.” The second problem is the constructive engagement by the agent can result in the unintended outcome and the further response of the agent can be more problematic because it can also result in more unintended outcomes. Strategic choice approach used by Collier and Norden (1992) for example shows that agent’s choice depends on strategic environment which does not always provide complete information to make agency fully understands the context.

In contrast with Emirbayer and Mische, Sewell’s conception of agency can be regarded as structure based. It starts with structure and then projects it to the agency. However, he views agency “not as opposed to, but as constituent of structure” (20). Agency is the one that is:

“capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree. … agents are empowered to act with and against others by structure: they have knowledge of the schemas that inform social life and have access to some measure of human and non human resources. Agency arises from the actor’s knowledge of schemas, which means the ability to apply them to new contexts. Agency is implied by the existence of structures” (20).

Therefore, Sewell also puts agency in an important place. However, his conception is different from Emirbayer and Mische in the sense that he puts the structure more as the source of the agency’s capacity. He clearly views agency as inseparable from the structure (something that seems to bother Emirbayer and Mische). In other words, the existence of structure constitutes the human agency. He further states that “capacity of agency… is inherent in all humans. But… humans are born with only a highly generalized capacity for agency…. The specific forms that agency will take consequently vary enormously and are culturally and historically determined” (20). Human has a kind of limited autonomous agency capacities at the first place which then develops depending upon the structure it encounters. On this, Sewell further states that “…agency differs enormously in both kind and extent. …what intention they can form, and what sort of creative transpositions they can carry out vary dramatically from one social world to another depending on the nature of the particular structures that inform those social world” (20-21).

The question is however; to what extent this born-agency capacity differs from one agency to another. Can this explanation be related to the different personal or psychological traits of individuals? From the leadership point of view, can this be the source of agency based explanation about the different outcome of the actions from different leaders? Unfortunately, Sewell does not elaborate more what he really means by “highly generalized capacity” of human agency. He does not explain further about what is the relationship of this inherent generalized capacity of agency with the next capacity that the agency gets later from its interaction with the structure. Is that relation is deterministic or more dynamic? If it is dynamic, what accounts for that? Do different agencies get the same empowerment from structure? Also, how the agency gets these agentic capacities? Sewell’s explanation does not give insight to answer those questions.

Mahoney and Snyder’s conception of human agency is different from both Emirbayer and Mische and Sewell. From their study on the explanation of regime change, they try to embrace/synthesize both agency based and structural based conception of human agency. According to them, “Voluntarist approaches conceive human behavior as underdetermined by social structures. In this view, actors’ identities and interests during regime transformations cannot be explained by social or economic roles. Human action is understood as a force external to and disengaged from “objective” social relations” (5). This conception is called undersocialized conception of human agency. Structural approaches on the other hand “treat the identities and interests of actors as defined by positions within social structures and view choices and actions as results of these positions” (5). This is called oversocialized conception of human agency.

The undersocialized conception on interaction between actors and change, Mahoney and Snyder continue, “deemphasizes the possibility that these interactions may be affected by pre-existing social relations which shape actors’ interests and capabilities” (5). This results in the tendency of voluntarist approaches to “overemphasize immediate, short-term processes, choices, and political crafting, while ignoring the extent to which “the possible” is conditioned by social structures” (5). The inverse problem occurs to the oversocialized conception of agency. It has bias for emphasizing long-term, impersonal processes and for overlooking the possibility that actors may have margins of maneuverability during periods of regime change (5).

Mahoney and Snyder’s proposal is to combine the two approaches of undersocialized and oversocialized human agency. They come up with “structurally conceptual based” and “voluntaist conceptual based” human agencies (6-7). There are two problems of this kind of broad conceptualization. First is objective problem. How do we decide that the problem we are dealing with can be analyzed by using structurally based or voluntary based human agency? Is it based on the characteristic of leadership during the time of regime change? Or, is it based on the type of socio-economic factors dominant during the time of regime change? Are there any other objective criteria for judging it? The second problem is subjective problem. By introducing the structurally based and voluntary based human agency, Mahoney and Snyder tend to leave it to the subjective tendency of the researcher in analyzing and explaining the problem. If the researcher tends to lean toward voluntarism, he /she will tend to use it as analytical tools and vise versa. Therefore this categorization is less helpful in conceptualizing further the role of leadership in change.

Defining Structure: Context and Culture?

In Emirbayer and Mische’s conceptualization, structure is defined more as contexts or environment in which human agency can show “varying degrees of maneuverability, inventiveness, and reflective choice in relation to the constraining and enabling contexts of action” (964). Structure or structural environment: “are both dynamically sustained by and altered trough human agency—by actors capable of formulating project for the future and realizing them, even if only in small part, and with unforeseen outcomes, in the present” (964).

This characterization of structure seems to imply that structure is more like a playing field for agency. This concept is again seems to be in line with Bhaskar’s notion that “structure may be only relatively autonomous. …, they do not exist independently of the conceptions that the agents possess of what they are doing, … (1979: 48). The different contexts or structure or environment affect agency’s construction on how to engage with it and later, the agency will prepare further response on the possible changing structure as a result of the previous temporal engagement. This can be regarded as a kind of Sewell’s characterization of human agency on its general agency capacity at the first place but Emirbayer and Mische apply it on structure. If this reading is true, Emirbayer and Mische look at the structure as having a sort of general impact on agency at the first place but the further impact depends on how the agency constructs its temporal engagement with the structure. Both agency and structure then is in the state of changing over time but the direction of change is more on the control of agency. This is one of the main problems of this characterization because it can lead to the impression that everything can be controlled by agency. If we accept the notion that agency does not always understand the structure as has been reiterated by Wendt, the problem is getting problematic. The failure of understanding the context will result in the improper temporal engagement construction which can lead to unintended outcomes. The strategic choice models for example, has suggested that the games that are played by agency in many instances (if not most) are not based on complete information, but the games of incomplete information in which there is no uncertainty about the environment or structure and the agency must rely on possible choices that can be drawn from the signal of the strategic environment.

Structure according to Sewell consists of schema and resources. Schema is “generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life. They are generalizable in the sense that they can be applied in or extended to various contexts of interactions” (8). Sewell’s examples of this schema are rules of etiquette, aesthetic norms, recipes for group actions, democratic vote, set of equivalence such as wet and dry, male and female, nature and culture, private and public, etc. This schema is generalized (can be transposed or extended) to new situations when there is opportunity (8). Resource as the second element of structure consists of two types: human and non human. Nonhuman resources are “objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that can be used to enhance or maintain power; human resources are physical strength, dexterity, knowledge, and emotional commitments that can be used to enhance or maintain power, including knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling, and propagating either human or nonhuman resources. Both type of resources are media of power and are unevenly distributed” (8-9).

In Sewell’s conception, structure is possible to change. Social transformation in his view cannot only explained by the change from outside the system. Social transformation can be generated by the operation of structure internal to society (16). This will be possible if the theory of structure adopts a multiple, contingent, and fractured conception of society and structure. He further suggests five axioms that will enable the social transformation. The five axioms are the multiplicity of structures, the transposibility of schemas, the unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy of resources, and the intersection of structures (16).

The room for human agency in Sewell’s construction of structure looks more limited that Emirbayer and Mische’s conceptualization. Sewell’s human agency’s role in social transformation depends on the five enabling axioms of the change. The most possible significant role of human agency in social transformation derives from the concept of transposability of schema. Agency’s knowledge of a rule or schema means “the ability to … apply it creatively” (Sewell: 18). The room of transposability is limited however, because it depends on the opportunity. This opportunity seems to be more structurally bounded.

According to Mahoney and Snyder, structure can be viewed from the constraint and generative models. Constraint model depends on the conception of structures as contingent constraint that “potentially limits the ability of actors to achieve their goals” (6). In constraint model “structural factors are treated as barriers external to actors which may or may not stand between them and the achievement of their autonomous goals and interests” (6). Generative model conceives structure as “necessary relations internalized by actors and from which their interests, identities and goals derive” (6). Structure constitutes the properties that define actors and motivate their behavior.

Constraints model looks to be more compatible with the concept of temporal constructed engagement of Emirbayer and Mische while generative model is more in line with the structure based concept from Sewell. From these two typologies of views on structures Mahoney and Snyder suggest that structure can be both constraining and empowering the actors (agency). Thus, they are not infavor of one or the other.

Agency – Structure Interaction

The main problem in understanding the interaction between agency and structure is the nature of their relationship. Is the relationship constitutive or causal or both? If the relationship is causal which one is more as a causal factor than the other? Emirbayer and Mische have clearly rejected the idea that agency and structure are mutually constitutive because they want to define agency from its own internal structure. They proposed a type of relationship called double constitution of agency and structure which means “temporal-relational contexts support particular agentic orientations, which in turn constitute different structuring relationships of actors toward their environments” (Emirbayer and Mische: 1004). This conception, according to them is different from mutually constitutive since the agency “is never so deeply intertwined with every aspect of” the structure (ibid). Mahoney and Snyder, with their integrative approach seem to leave it out to the choice of researchers whether or not to use funnel, path dependent or eclectic strategies in combining the role of agency and structure. They are more concerned with how the conceptual framework could provide analytical tool that include both structure and agency. Sewell seems to embrace the idea that agency is “deeply intertwined with every aspect of the structure.” Sewell’s structure as the source of agency’s empowerment (schema and resources) is compatible with the idea of resources from Galbraith (1983) and Swiddler’s idea on culture as a tool kit (1986). It is not clear however whether these resources/tool kits are the constitutive elements or the causal factors of the human agency.

With regard to the outcome of human agency’s action, what is the nature of the structure’s role/effect? Sewell seems to see it more deterministic than Emirbayer and Mische, while Mahoney and Snyder look it as more situational, depends on the approach that is used. In helping to understand this, the view from critical realist such as Bhaskar (1979) and Lewis (2002) can be useful. They suggest that, although not deterministic to the behavior of human agency, social rules and resources given by structure may exert important influence to social affairs/actions (Lewis, 2002: 20). Structure, in this conception provides material cause while human agency provides efficient cause to the outcome. Material cause provide medium of action for human agency, while human agency is acted as the driving force because of its creative and initiative capacity.

Conclusion: Some Preliminary Lessons for Leadership and Change

Although not specific, the above discussion on several conceptualizations on agency, structure and the relationship between the two have provided some insights on the role of leadership as human agency and change. Clearly, the explanation of social affairs/events cannot be viewed from the perspective which is in favor one and eliminating the other. The discussion from Emirbayer and Mische, Sewell, and Mahoney and Snyder suggests that it is possible that the intensity of human agency’s role will be various from one situation to another. Leader or human agency plays roles in change, but it depends on what kind of structure the human agency encounters and what kind of human agency that is playing the game. A Mahoney and Snyder’s eclectic strategy is one example of this insight.

Although the place for human agency has been provided--at least by the three articles reviewed in this paper, to put leadership as a distinct human agency requires the social scientist to view it as an individual agency. The three articles do not clearly discuss this or give more insight. Sewell only mentions briefly that agency is collective as well as individual (21). But again, his explanation on this tends to put individual to be bound to collectivity. Therefore in an effort to understand leadership as a distinct individual agent the discussion in more literature is needed. Until we can explain that the individual agency can act and make a difference without necessarily bound to collectivity or structure the conceptualization on leader’s agentic nature will always be under criticism. Finally, there is still not much discussion on how to put the issue of personality or personal traits into the debate between structure and agency. This is important because if the leader is conceptualized as individual human agency there must be explanation on why several leaders seem to act differently even in the same structural constraints/empowerments.

Bibliography:

Bhaskar, Roy. 1979. The Possibility of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences. Sussex: The Harvester Press.

Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Collier, David; Deborah L. Norden. 1992. “Strategic Choice Models of Political Change in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 24 (2): 229-243.

Emirbayer, Mustafa and Ann Mische. 1998. “What Is Agency?” American Journal of Sociology 103 (4): 962-1023.

Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1983. The Anatomy of Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Hays, Sharon. 1994. “Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture.” Sociological Theory 12 (1): 57-72.

Imbroscio, David L. 1999. “Structure, Agency, and Democratic Theory.” Polity 32 (1): 45-66.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. “Review: Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?” The American Political Science Review 86 (4): 1028-1034.

Lewis, Paul. A. 2002. “Agency, Structure and Causality in Political Science: A Comment on Sibeon.” Politics 22 (1): 17-23.

Mahoney, James and Richard Snyder. 1999. “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change.” Studies in International Comparative Development Summer: 3-32.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992. “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation.” The American Journal of Sociology 98 (1): 1-29.

Swiddler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review 51 (2): 273-286.

Wendt, Alexander. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 41 (3): 335-370.

KKV’s Designing Social Inquiry as a Common Ground
Djayadi Hanan

My position with regard to KKV’s Designing Social Inquiry is that I agree and support their main purpose and general advices for both quantitative and qualitative researchers to focus on the importance of scientific research design in making sure that their research will be valuable. I am, however, skeptical to several parts of their arguments and its implications to the practice of research and to the scientific community especially on the side of qualitative tradition.

The main argument of KKV is that the differences between qualitative and quantitative traditions are actually “only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant” (1994:4). Why this is so? Because “all good research can be understood—indeed is best understood—to derive from the same underlying logic of inference. Both quantitative and qualitative can be systematic and scientific” (ibid: 4-5). Statistical or quantitative technique is not always necessary. Instead, the importance is that the researcher pays a great attention to the “rules of scientific inference” (ibid: 6). Scientific research in social science according to KKV can be conducted when the research’s design can approximately meet four characteristics. The research is designed to reach inference, to use the explicit procedure in which public can see it and other researcher can replicate it, to be aware that the conclusion is uncertain, and to adhere to a set of rules of inference on which its validity depends (ibid: 7-9).

I would agree with KKV’s argument at this point because in fact, when the research is conducted the researcher usually combines the qualitative and quantitative data and analysis. Mahoney and Geertz (2006) for example, after examining ten criteria of qualitative and quantitative research, conclude that the labels quantitative and qualitative cannot explain the difference between the two traditions. All quantitative analysis also rely heavily on words for interpretation. On the other side, qualitative analysis quite frequently uses quantitative information or data. KKV themselves provide a number examples of research that rely both on quantitative and qualitative techniques such as Martin’s Coercive Cooperation and Putnam’s Making Democracy Works. Another recent example is from Bates et.al (1998) on The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition which discusses the democratic transition in Zambia and ethnic violence in Yugoslavia by combining the quantitative methods of game theory and rational choice and interpretive approach.

An attempt to have or to propose a kind of what Laitin (1995) calls “common vocabulary and common standard” is very logical if we want to have a kind of common ground between quantitative and qualitative traditions. This common ground should be minimum or broad enough to include as many approaches as possible without losing its capability of disciplining the thought (ibid: 454). In line with this argument, the minimum standard of characteristic of scientific research proposed by KKV, in my opinion, is broad enough to include statistically minded scholars, formal modelers, comparativists, thick description proponents, and interpretivists. None of these research traditions will deny that they seek inference in their research, all of them use certain procedure in their endeavor, not only interpretivists will agree that their conclusion is uncertain but the statistically minded scholar also will say that their conclusion is probabilistic, and finally all approaches will agree as well that they use certain rules in making inference. Therefore, in a general sense, I think, KKV’s proposal for a common ground should be supported.

KKV also argues that there are two kinds of inference: descriptive and causal. Descriptive inference is “the process of understanding of unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations (KKV, 1994: 55). Causal inference is meant to meet the need for causal explanation of the phenomena that the researcher studies. Causality is defined in terms of causal effect: “the difference between the systematic component of observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when the explanatory variable takes on another value” (ibid: 82). The differentiation between descriptive and causal inference enables KKV to bridge between the claim that social science research seeks for understanding particular event and that social science research seeks for generality. KKV believe, “where possible, social science research should be both general and specific” and “timeless and timebound at the same time” (ibid: 43). Descriptive inference can focus the researcher to understanding while causal inference to explanation. Depending on what the real subject of investigation is, the researcher can stop at descriptive inference or further pursue the causal inference.

Another point that KKV make clear is that social science is a collective enterprise. It is an endeavor that is conducted by many researchers across time, field, and method/tradition. Qualitative researchers are usually accused of working only with single observation such as a case study (small-n studies). In quantitative tradition, the problem of small-n is cured by increasing the number of observations then it will be able to be used for testing hypotheses or theories. This procedure cannot be applied to qualitative research because it deliberately deals with small-n or even single observation. Does it mean that qualitative research cannot make causal explanation? KKV’s answer to this is no.

According to KKV, because social science is a collective enterprise, “a single observation can be useful for evaluating causal explanations if it is part of a research program. If there are other single observations, perhaps gathered by other researchers, against which it can be compared, it is no longer a single observation” (ibid: 211). In their response to their critics KKV (1995) gave an example of this from the work of Lijphart on The Politics of Accomodation. Lijphart, in his research in 1968, intended to test the causal effect of the pluralist theory which says that the existence of cross cutting cleavages will increase the likelihood of social peace and legitimate and stable democratic government. Lijphart conducted his observation only in one country: Netherland. He found that this country had deep religious and class cleavages with very few cross cutting. He further found however that Netherland, by pluralist theory measurement, is socially peace with legitimate and stable democratic government. Because Lijphart based his study on previous scholars by measuring different variable (social peace instead of social conflict as previous researchers did), Lijphart observation cannot be considered as one observation. Therefore, his inference is valid and can be used to rule out the previous one. This is an example of collective enterprise. This is also the reason why qualitative research, which, for example focuses only descriptive inference, can be complementary to quantitative research which seeks causal explanation because any research with good scientific standard as proposed by KKV will contribute to this collective enterprise.

As many other critics of KKV, as a political science student, I am skeptical to several parts of KKV’s account. I will just point out some of them here.
Although KKV maintains that qualitative and quantitative approaches are not superior to each other, they clearly imply that causal inference is superior to descriptive inference. They for example states: “analysis is incomplete without causal inference… just as causal inference is impossible without good descriptive inference, descriptive inference alone is often unsatisfying and incomplete” (1994: 75). In their discussion on the chapter of descriptive inference (chapter 2), KKV tend to put most of the qualitative interpretivist works into descriptive. The definition of descriptive inference itself points out to “understanding,” the word which usually attached to the aim of qualitative works. Wendt (1998: 108) also concludes that KKV in their “Designing Social Inquiry, … accept that Understanding or constitutive theory is a distinct intellectual activity, but consider that activity to be descriptive inference.” The implication is that the qualitative works will still fall into second to quantitative ones. One of the proponents of KKV, Laitin (1995: 455) describes:

With a disciplinary division of labor, the search for valid causal inferences invites participation of scholars on both sides of our present disciplinary divide. …the discipline is open to pure describers. Historical and anthropological interpretation are potentially fundamental for us, just so long as researchers in this mode seek to distinguish what is systematic--and what, random-in the particular events they are interpreting.

Wendt (ibid) further argues that treating understanding or constitutive theory as descriptive will “inevitably have the effect of reinforceing the prejudice that it is second best, inferior, and not fully ‘science’”. This will render the main aim of KKV to provide common ground for both traditions.

Characterization of KKV to most of qualitative works as descriptive raises question. Is it true that understanding is only descriptive? According to Wendt (1998), although not in terms of causality, understanding or constitutive theory indeed gives explanation. He gives example in which when a child ask his father “what is a dog?” and the child’s father answer with “man’s best friend”, this answer is not only descriptive. It is also explanatory because it is explaining the role of dogs in human society and that dogs are not dangerous to human being (best friend). Besides that, according to Wendt, inferences, including descriptive inference, are always based on theories and the nature of theories is explaining.

Since causal inference is one most important goal in scientific research, KKV provide advices to qualitative researchers in order for them to achieve this goal. Although at the beginning of the book KKV clearly send signal that they “do not wish to encourage the exclusive use of quantitative techniques” (1994: 6), their advices to qualitative researchers to achieve causal inference are mainly statistical. This has invited heated criticism from qualitative researcher such as Alford (1995). He (1995: 425) writes: “The result is a set of inappropriate rules of causal inference for qualitative research, rules that cannot deal with dynamic and complex processes occurring in one or a few cases.” The problem, according to Alford is not on the researcher that includes too few cases or has no control at all on their explanatory variables, but the problem is on the view of the theory as a hypothesis stating that two or three variables are causally related.

This then raises another skepticism. Because KKV’s advices to qualitative researcher are mainly statistical: Can it overcome epistemological question that qualitative researcher is facing? Bartells (in Laitin, 1995) for example pointed out that the problem of context in area studies, which requires them not to seek generality, cannot be overcome merely by statistical convention such as increasing the number of cases. Context in this research tradition holds that it is “highly determinative of outcome yet itself not subject to variable analysis” (ibid: 454). Formal modeling and statistical method will be difficult also to be reconciled with Schwartz’s (1984) suggestion that comparative political scientist needs to study political participation from the perspective of subjectivity. Studying participation according to Schwartz must “avoid simply imposing the researcher’s theoretical assumption onto the data and begin to appreciate the diversity of self understanding that the people hold” (ibid: 1139). Statistical advice from KKV will also be difficult to be applied to the study of Rudolph and Rudolph (2003) on subjective knowledge which analyzes the diary of one person to understand and explain identity formation in British India. The main point here is that statistical method will not be able to accept that subjective knowledge as part of science. In the beginning of their book, KKV admitted that they are dealing with objective knowledge. They states: “we assume that it is possible to have some knowledge of external world but that such knowledge is always uncertain” (1994: 6).

Another skepticism to KKV’s common ground is about how far their “precepts and rules” can encompass multiple methods especially in qualitative tradition. McKeown (1999) has made an assessment that given their strong reliance on statistical method in framing scientific endeavor and their position that view the superiority of causal than descriptive inference, the status of several research techniques in the study of international relations remain unclear. Included in this category, according to McKeown are the constructions of decision or game trees, and computer language, or ordinary language representations of a decision making process (ibid: 175). According to Alford (1995: 426), interpretivist and historical works in KKV’s account are “downgraded to preparation for the genuine scientific work of causal inference.” Besides that, Alford added that KKV also ignore the development in rhetorical and cultural studies by emphasizing formal modeling and statistical criteria.

It seems to me that KKV, through this book, will reach only those researchers in the same tradition as theirs who see that their reliance on quantitative techniques is not enough in answering several or some part of their research questions. Putnam’s Making Democracy Works piece can be a good example of this. According to Tarrow (1995), Putnam, after spending about two decades conducting and administering his research by using quantitative design and techniques, faced difficulties in explaining big differences that he found between Italy’s north central and southern regions. His quantitative analysis only provided indirect evidence. As a way out, he turned to history from which he discovered that civic tradition that provides “social capital” was available in the north while lacking in the south.

Finally, this account, which is aimed to be the common ground between quantitative and qualitative tradition, was written by positivists, but the spirit is patronizing to qualitative researchers. This is not a good writing strategy since it sends the message that the authors still hold their superiority view over the qualitative tradition. Indeed in the substance of the account this superiority feeling is still implied, as I have mentioned above. This book, to be more productive, should have been written in another fashion: instead of the quantitative researcher patronizing and advising the qualitative researcher, it will be much better written in a fashion where quantitative researchers try to show how qualitative work can be fruitful for quantitative works. That way it will serve its aim of providing common ground. Or to be even more advanced: the book should have been written collaboratively by quantitative and qualitative researchers.

References:

Alford, Robert R. “Review: Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research”. by Gary King; Robert O. Keohane; Sidney Verba. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 3. (May, 1995), pp. 424-427.

Bates, Robert H. et.al., “The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Tradition.” Politics and Society, Vol. 26, No.4 (Dec. 1998), pp. 603-642.

King, Gary. et.al. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

_________ “Review: The Importance of Research Design in Political Science.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2. (Jun., 1995), pp. 475-481.

Laitin, David D. “The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s Desiging Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2. (Jun., 1995), pp. 454-456.

McKeown, Timothy J. “Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.” International Organization 53, 1, (Winter 1999), pp. 161-190.

Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. “Engaging Subjective Knowledge: How Amar Singh’s Diary Narratives of and by the Self Explain Identity Formation.” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Dec. 2003), pp. 681-693.

Schwartz, Joel D. “Participation and Multisubjective Understanding: An Interpretivist Approach to the Study of Political Participation.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46. No. 4. (Nov., 1984), pp. 1117-1141.

Tarrow, Sidney. “Review: Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2. (Jun., 1995), pp. 471-474.

Wendt, Alexander. “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations.” British International Studies Association, (1998). pp. 101-117.

Djayadi Hanan

Book Review

Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, People Power Movements in Nondemocracies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, xxvi pp., 228 pp.

Schock’s purpose of writing this book is twofold. First, to contribute to the theory of democratization from the perspective of social movements by explaining the process of mass political contention which, almost always precedes democratization. The literature on democratization usually only emphasizes either on the structural requisites of democracy or transaction among elites. Second, to contribute to the increasing application of the political process approach to explanations of political contentions in non-democracies and to include the nonviolence explanation into the social movement studies (xviii). Political process model (PPM), according to Schock, is strong on explaining the emergence of social movements, while non violence action (NVA) is better in explaining its trajectories and emphasizes on the role of agency, especially strategy in promoting political change. NVA is also important because its use has been increasing in contemporary social movements related to democratic transition (16-23).

Unarmed insurrection is defined as “organized popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods of nonviolence action rather than on armed method” (xvi). It is characterized by “…network oriented mobilizing structures, the implementation of a broad range of nonviolent actions, and the effective targeting of the state’s dependence relations…” (55). The focus is on pragmatic nonviolence action. It is deliberately chosen by the movement as method of struggle, not as a lifestyle (xvii).

By comparing unarmed insurrections in six countries, Schock applies the approaches of PPM and NVA to answer his main question: How and why the unarmed insurrections in South Africa, the Philippines, Nepal, and Thailand were successful while in Burma and China were failed? The main argument is that the success and failure of the movement depend on the availability of the political opportunity (both internal and external factors) and the ability of the movement through NVA to be resilient and to leverage those opportunities. There are three keys to Schock’s argument. First, the paradox of repression. All regimes responded with series of repression to the movements, but the effect was different. In South Africa, the Philippines, Nepal, and Thailand it resulted in the strengthening of the challengers while in Burma and China resulted in the collapse of the movements. Schock explains that “… repression may increase or decrease mobilization depending on the presence or absence of other dimensions in the opportunity structure” (33) such as the influential allies. Schock calls this process as “political jiujitsu” dynamic in which the capacity and will of the challengers to reject the repression grow quickly while the state’s capacity and will to govern through repression erode (65). Second, the movement’s resilience. This resilience is determined by whether or not the challengers’ organization is decentralized or centralized. The more decentralized the movement, the more resilient it will be. It is also dependent on the capacity of the NVA to apply as many methods of NVA as possible. Third, leveraging capacity or the ability to activate the third parties to support the movement. In part this is related to the first and second factors, and in another part it depends on the appeal of the movement as an NVA. When people (and elites) perceive that the government’s response to the NVA with violence is un-acceptable, then the movement can leverage to activate more third parties to support it.

Several critiques can be raised to Schock’s account. First, how and why the people choose the NVA is not explained very clearly. Knowing that the regime’s reputation in using violence is high like in China and Burma, why people chose the NVA? How do they know that NVA is the best strategy in challenging the regime? Do people (organizations) choose NVA because of deliberately analyzing its strengths and weaknesses or because people do not have other choices? The role of leadership can be the answer here, but Schock does not address it clearly. Second, his claim that NVA can be more important than political opportunity (162) is questionable. Part of his argument is that when the movement started, the political opportunity facilitates its emergence. But the NVA itself can create opportunity. Therefore, the divisions among political or military elites, for instance, can be the outcome rather than precondition of the movement (162). The problem to this claim is that why in Burma and China this could not happen. The plausible answer will be because there was no precondition of military or elite division before the movement. This means that political opportunity more fundamental than NVA. All countries that Schock studied show that where political opportunity is available, the movement succeeds and where the political opportunity is un-favorable, the movement fails. Third, why in countries like the Philippines the broad based umbrella organizations (to facilitate decentralized movement) could emerge while in Burma and China could not? How do we explain this? Part of the answer can probably be the nature of the regime. Differentiating which non democratic regime still allows the emergence of civil society organizations and which one does not is important. Unfortunately Schock regards non-democracies in residual category which means we cannot differentiate the type of non-democratic regimes. Fourth, many non-democratic countries like the Philippines before 1986, if not embraced isolationist policy like Burma, are very dependent on international context/support. Out of political opportunity dimensions of Schock’s model (influential allies, elite division, state repression, information flow), it is possible that this international context is a necessary condition, although not sufficient for the movement to succeed or fail. Schock’s model does not differentiate this; rather, he argues that the combination of all of these factors coupled with NVA that contribute to the success and failure of the movement.

Schock’s account can make contribution in at least three areas namely to the study of social movements, to the study of politics (democratization), and to the practice of social movements.

In the study of social movement, this book modifies the political opportunity approach by including the international context and broadening the opportunity scope. International context works through three levels and types of relations with the national: “(1) the extent to which a country is integrated with or isolated from the international system, (2) the extent to which a country is dependent upon another country, and (3) the nature of economic relations with other countries” (154). This study also broadens the dimensions of the opportunity by including influential allies from outside of the polity (such as Church in the Philippines) and the information flow. Political process approach application is also extended by its utilization in non-democratic context especially in the study of democratization in developing countries.

The inclusion of NVA can give insight on how to understand the trajectories of the movement and offset the shortcoming of political process approach. McAdam et al. admitted that “Movement largely born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions” (quoted by Schock: 35). The NVA approach can specify how “power is used strategically…to undermine the state and alter the political context…” by using “…methods of contention that increase the likelihood of the success…” (36). In addition, Schock’s effort to conduct a comparative approach among the six countries is not only still rare in the study of social movement but also will give more insights to understand the social movement beyond the state/national capacity and context. Lastly, this study contributes to the social movement by explaining that political opportunity is dynamic and the movement itself can reduce or increase it along the way (162). Having this explanation, the mismatch of perception between objective opportunity and subjective opportunity as identified by Kurzman (1996) in Iranian Revolution case or by Schock in the case of China in this book, can be explained.

This account can also contribute to the study of politics, especially on democratization. It implies that mass political contention is not an epiphenomenon of the democratic transition. It is substantially part of it and by strengthening and increasing political opportunity it can contribute to the process of democratization. Democratization is not only caused by the availability of structural requisites of democracy or by elite’s transaction but also enabled by the unarmed insurrection. This movement for example, can create situation which forces political elites to withdraw their support to the regime. Another contribution is the insight that toppling authoritarian regime does not necessarily have to use violence or armed struggle. People power or unarmed insurrection, at least in four countries out of six of this study is possible to make “peaceful revolution.”

Last but not least, this study can also provide many useful insights to the social movement activists. Political opportunity should be leveraged by the movement to make it successful. The most salient one is the strength of a decentralized but coordinated organization of movement. Schock provides analysis in this book that decentralized organization will be more able to be resilient especially in facing the repression from the regime (142-153). His analysis also suggests that it is important for the movement to have a clear and limited goal, to embrace oppositional consciousness and temporary organizations rather than rigid ideology, to use multiple channels of resistance, to design and implement multiple methods of NVA, to have maneuvers in many places and spaces, and finally to make sure the use of communication and reference to public (163-170).

In conclusion, Schock’s account on unarmed insurrections has provided us with more comprehensive theoretical approach by modifying political opportunity approach and non-violence actions insight to understand the success and failure of people power/unarmed insurrection in several countries. These two approaches, when combined together, are very useful to understand not only how the movement emerges but also its dynamic and trajectories. His comparative method is also still rare in the study of social movement and has implication on understanding the social movement beyond the state capacity level.